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Abstract
This paper discusses corporate entanglement, impactfulness and responsibility 
in the Anthropocene, amidst events and conditions that ‘uncontain’ time. It takes its 
direction of travel from artist Brian Jungen’s ‘Cetology’ (2002), a whalebone sculp-
ture made out of cut-up plastic garden chairs, which conjoins the times of earth and 
world history, as it hangs in the air of the art gallery, ‘as if’ exhibited in the natural 
history museum. The paper relates ‘Cetology’s’ engagement with natural history, 
time, and commodification to matters of corporate entanglement and responsibility 
within company law and governance. Problems with understanding the comparable 
imprint of large and multinational companies on matters, places, and communities 
are identified, after the domination of corporate legal frameworks over nature and 
the stability and perfection of economic incentives at law. The reading of this (criti-
cal-legal) situation is developed through theory and engagement with materialist and 
critical thinkers, who unite in their concern with distributed human–nature relations 
and the ‘concreteness’ that attends collisions in time, ruin and affect. Walter Benja-
min and Theodor Adorno’s writings are central to this analysis, and strengthen the 
commentary on ‘natural history’ themes curated by Jungen. The paper contemplates 
how times’ uncontainment might invoke a change in expectation and method for the 
company law field, assigning contingency to the corporation and provoking a new 
mode of reflection about corporate entanglement and responsibility at law.
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Introduction
This paper discusses corporate entanglement, impactfulness and responsibil-
ity in uncontained times. The latter term (uncontained times) expresses the inter-
est of the author in thinking corporate law and governance for the world impacted, 
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over generations, by industry, commerce and globalisation and for the epoch of the 
Anthropocene.1 This is where material migrations of human affect and activity, and 
their cumulative impact on nature and people, have become as pertinent (norma-
tively, politically, operationally, economically) to businesses and the future of cor-
porate institutions as the linking up of regions, organisations, technologies and mar-
kets.2 Mounting anthropogenic entanglements create a situation where there is ‘a 
constant conceptual traffic between Earth history and world history’, and the inter-
connection of ‘events that happen on vast geological scales—such as changes to the 
whole climate system of the planet—with what we might do in the everyday lives of 
individuals, collectivities, institutions, and nations’ (Chakrabarty 2018, p. 6). Histo-
rian Dipesh Chakrabarty highlights how these earthly entanglements ‘outscale our 
very human sense of time’, and inaugurate a perspectival shift in the consciousness 
of change and responsibility or duty: ‘It is as if the Earth system were saying to the 
conscious part of its constituents, humans … “you never look at me from the place 
from which I see you”’ (ibid. p. 29).
The paper’s focus on corporate entanglement and responsibility fits with this 
special issue’s effort to reassess legal ‘theories and frameworks that have prevailed 
within dominant accounts of law, rights, governance, sovereignty and the ordering 
of associative life’ (Birrell and Matthews 2020). It proceeds by situating compa-
nies and commerce within ‘the entangled sphere of the relations that the Anthro-
pocene has illuminated’ (ibid.) and in uncontained times. The paper observes how 
efforts to cultivate responsibility within corporate legal orders currently extend the 
self-governance of companies and market order, as a means of ‘managing’ diffuse 
entanglements.3 Yet by doing so current policies would also seem to pull back from 
the ‘disturbed certainties’ (Chakrabarty 2018, p. 31), which attend the integration 
of geological and human time-scales, and to affirm the place of companies at the 
centre of world history instead. The paper, concerned about this approach, explores 
the possibility that the histories coming to light might better ‘de-center’ the corpora-
tion and dramatise its interconnectedness, as a legal personality that intersects with a 
huge range of existents (human, non-human) and experiences that bear upon justice 
and equality. It explores the development of companies’ actions and impactfulness 
1 The term ‘Anthropocene’ refers to a new proposed geological epoch in which humans and human soci-
eties have become the dominant influence over climate and the environment. On the definition and impli-
cations, see Steffen et  al. (2007). Relating a ‘New Climatic Regime’ and the affect histories of recent 
modernity and economic globalisation (dated to eras of deregulation and the dismantling of the welfare 
state in the 1980s and 1990s), see Latour (2018, pp. 17–21).
2 Relevant periods of industrialisation are commonly dated by Anthropocene scholars to around the 
1800s, to the industrial revolution, see Malm (2016) and/or to a later ‘accelerated’ period of post-war 
economic development, see Steffen et al. (2007) and also Chakrabarty (2018, pp. 11–13). Latour (2018, 
p. 10) names relevant affect migrations as ‘without form and nation’, and as concerning ‘climate, erosion, 
pollution, resource depletion, habitat destruction’.
3 The term ‘corporate legal order’ is used in this paper to reference a body of laws and institutions that 
undergird the elevated position of companies, particularly large and listed multinational companies, 
within the global economic order as a whole. It comprises, at least, corporate and financial law, attendant 
regulatory and governance institutions, as well as property law and private law.
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among ‘matters’,4 places and communities, and the confinement of some impacted 
existents to the margins. It thinks, further, about routes out of this (confinement) and 
about how temporal mutinies might bear upon and renew expectations for the corpo-
rate legal field, from and for the margins.
In terms of method, the paper begins by encountering Brian Jungen’s sculptural 
work, ‘Cetology’ (2002) in the art gallery. The analysis serves to highlight the impli-
cation of commodity trails, relatable to economic actors, and to comment on indus-
trial histories that juxtapose the different times of earth and world history. Critical 
methods are used in Part II to relate this dis-containment of time to the field of com-
pany law, and to describe and assess the current drive to corporate responsibility and 
sustainability in UK law and governance. Problems with understanding earth his-
tory and the imprint of multinational companies on matters, places, and communi-
ties over time are identified, after the domination of corporate legal frameworks over 
nature and the stability and perfection of economic incentives at law. The reading 
of this (critical-legal) situation is developed, in Part III, through theory and engage-
ment with materialist and critical thinkers, united in their concern with distributed 
human-nature relations and with the concrete impacts that attend collisions in time, 
ruin and affect. Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno’s writings are central to this 
analysis, and strengthen the commentary on ‘natural history’ themes, curated by 
Jungen. Part IV offers, finally, to clarify the paper’s interest in substituting the natu-
ralness of the company, and also management, with spontaneous concern for the 
affected and for existences that lie within horizons of ruin and disorder at law. The 
paper contemplates how times’ uncontainment could and should invoke a change in 
expectation and method for the company law field, assigning more contingency to 
the corporation and provoking a new mode of reflection about corporate entangle-
ment and responsibility at law.
I
This is ‘Cetology’ (Fig. 1), a monumental whalebone sculpture conceptualised, fab-
ricated and exhibited in the Vancouver Art Gallery by Canadian and Dane-zaa artist, 
Brian Jungen (2002). The sculpture is suspended in the air of the art gallery, as if 
hanging in the classic style of a natural history museum exhibit. Closer inspection 
reveals, however, that the work is not fashioned out of natural materials or fossilised 
mammal bones. It is, in fact, cut out of plastic (polypropylene) patio chairs, a mass 
manufactured product, redeployed and made unfamiliar in Jungen’s work. (The artist 
has a reputation for experimenting with commercial products to create unfamiliar 
4 ‘Matters’ relatable to the company are referenced throughout the paper (as ‘corporate matters’) and are 
causally linked within this to the latter’s actions, mediations, and networks. In line with scholarship of 
law and ‘materiality’, these matters also presume the agencies of living organisms and ‘vital matters’, and 
the force associated with aggregate existence, i.e. geological change. For a discussion of the terms, and 
on how law comes to care about such ‘matters’, see Kang and Kendall (2019) and Davies (2017).
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constructions; he has previously worked with golf bags, Nike running shoes, freez-
ers and sofas.)
Jungen’s work captures the cultural significance and majesty of nature alongside 
a strong sense of the environmental and existential dangers that face marine life and 
some (human, non-human) communities in the context of climate change, oceans of 
plastic, pollution, commercial hunting and overfishing. The sculpture registers a dra-
matic change in what societies might monumentalize in the Anthropocene, as man-
made materials, like polypropylene, take on existences and entanglements separate 
to their product and commercial existence.5 This is where artefacts, like the patio 
chairs that Jungen cuts up, ‘live on’ and exist beyond their ‘usefulness’ to companies 
and consumers (Brown 2015, p. 206). This ‘living on’ happens where the decom-
position of plastics and industrial materials, used in the chairs, reaches upwards of 
hundreds of years, and generates entanglements that reach into human and non-
human food chains, soil structures, ocean beds, and (ultimately) mineralized fossil 
records. It acquires historical dimensions, following Christopher Tomlin’s conceptu-
alisation of ‘law’s objects’ and Fortleben,6 as ‘the soul of the original that is past (its 
once-was), its afterlife that survives in translation, and its living on that moves else-
where’ (Tomlins 2018, p. 7). In a reference to this separate and also double existence 
(commercial, material), some of the chairs that Jungen used for the sculpture were 
put into production with the Canadian Tire price tags still on.7 ‘Cetology’, as such, 
and reaching for accolades that Theodor Adorno once conferred on Walter Benja-
min, awakens ‘congealed life in petrified objects—as in allegory’. He encourages the 
gallery visitor (turned natural history museum visitor) to ‘scrutinize living things so 
that they present themselves as being ancient, “ur-historical” and abruptly release 
their significance’ (Adorno 1983, p. 233).8
Jungen’s work is interesting, for this paper and issue, for where it leads its visitors 
quizzically and contemplatively through an unexpected experience of plastic, natu-
ral-cultural entanglement, and through the intended and unintended consequences 
of commerce and modernity. Theodor Adorno in his 1932 (but posthumously pub-
lished) lecture concerning the ‘idea of natural history’ (1984) also fascinated over 
this consequential horizon, where the diffuse elements of nature and history ‘break 
apart and interweave at the same time in such a fashion that the natural appears as 
a sign for history and history’ (ibid. p. 121). The lecture identified ‘natural history’ 
as a problem that ‘from the perspective of philosophy presents itself first as the 
8 The term ‘ur-historical’ relates to the work of Walter Benjamin (Benjamin 1999) and his development 
of ‘the idea of natural history’ as an ‘ur-history’ of the nineteenth century that sought to ‘trace’ living 
history from the surfaces of ‘surviving’ objects and ‘ruin’, and by working with and from visual ‘con-
creteness’. For a discussion, see Buck-Morss (1991), Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
5 Jungen’s sculpture precedes much recent discussion about and popularisation of the Anthropocene 
concept, and carries, as such, a telling or predictive power.
6 ‘Fortleben’ translates as ‘continuing life’ and ‘living on but also living away’ (Tomlins 2018, p. 7). The 
concept is drawn by Tomlins from Walter Benjamin’s work on translation and (acting beyond) intention, 
for instance ‘The Task of the Translator’ in Benjamin (2015, pp. 70–82).
7 Numerous websites publicising the sculpture and Jungen’s art relate this detail (of price tags being still 
visible in some parts of the sculpture), for instance, see Orozco (2012): https ://juste ment.org/post/15403 
22150 5/brian -junge n-shape shift erpar tial-cetol ogy-126 (Accessed 25 August 2020).
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question of how it is possible to know and interpret an alienated, reified, dead world’ 
(ibid. p. 118), of ‘things created by man, yet lost to him’ (ibid. p. 117). Adorno’s 
wider writings (with Horkheimer 1997) would eventually explain the philosopher’s 
views on the fate of lost and adventitious elements in commercial societies, and how 
they became ‘disenchanted’ or ‘alienated’ after the modern drive to human mastery 
over nature (in science, reason, economy, etc.). It is, however, in this earlier lec-
ture that Adorno expressed his interest in creating political-normative encounters 
with existences thrown into such a state of ruin, and onto the natural history register. 
He speaks about his determination to bring mortified and estranged natures ‘out of 
infinite distance’ and ‘into infinite closeness’, as objects of philosophical interpre-
tation (ibid. p. 119). He cites (admiringly, again) the work of his peer and fellow 
philosopher, Benjamin, as the turning point for realising this ambition, and for read-
ing history on the surfaces of the surviving, as the ‘register of the trace’. We learn 
about progress, in this reading, not by trying to fit the alienated and discounted (or 
their ‘living on’) into ‘general structures’, but in ‘paradigms’ and ‘as interpretations 
of concrete history’, which reveal themselves on the surfaces of objects, in ruin and 
in transience (ibid. p. 119). Ruin invokes the ‘structure of inner-historical events’ 
(ibid. p. 117),9 and suggests reading fragmented matters in ‘an upward direction at 
every single one of its points’, for which, ‘allegory is the key mode of expression’ 
(ibid. p. 119).
Fig. 1  Cetology—Brian Jungen. Image by ¡Carlitos (Creative Commons license, available to view at 
https ://searc h.creat iveco mmons .org/photo s/9760d 400-8149-4f26-aae2-2593b 69262 84 (accessed 17 Sep-
tember 2020))
9 ‘Whenever an historical element appears it refers back to the natural element that passes away within 
it’ (Adorno 1984, p. 120).
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‘Cetology’, also, philosophically dis-contains temporal compressions and casti-
gations. Price tags sit furtively within the bones of the whale structure, accounting 
for the stealth of industry, clocks, for semiautomatic trading platforms and all the 
rest. But none—tags, clocks, calculators—take control of history. Jungen, instead, 
juxtaposes commodity histories (price tags on) and the incalculable histories that 
lie before and after production (the manufacturing demand on ecosystems, cultural 
homogenisation, waste and ruin). As allegorist, Jungen takes a break from ‘the 
affirmative power of linear time’, and the latent desire within companies and markets 
to ‘resolve tensions among priorities, loyalties and accountabilities’ (Greenhouse 
1989, p. 1638). ‘Cetology’ plays, instead, on temporal mutinies and dis-contain-
ments, monumentalising generations of history and tradition (the aura of the whale, 
the skills employed for re-fabricating the plastic) and the social, economic, cultural, 
and biological entanglements that mount, after time (and after industry, mass pro-
duction, economic globalisation, et cetera).
The work also transforms the proximity that visitors might experience in relation 
to the furniture, from chairs that command the patio and BBQ to artefacts that hang, 
distant, in the air of the natural history museum, as if they might perform additional 
normative and interpretive functions. The plastic commodities-cum-whale take on a 
different kind of ‘aura’ in this situation, perhaps which they lost in mass manufac-
ture and consumption. Importantly, though, the chairs acquire this aura, or renewed 
capacity for ‘voice’, as geological agents and as ruin (rather than as industrial inno-
vations or wealth generators). This negative extensiveness is juridically important, 
where it happens at intra-temporal and cumulative proportions, impacting a com-
munity’s experience of harms, if not the most basic physical processes of the planet. 
It relates, in fact, to intensively-scaled or ‘new’ harms, defined by philosopher Judith 
Lichtenberg (2010) as the intended and unintended consequences of actions, which 
stretch across—and thereby uncontain—a multiplicity of time-scales, networks, 
actors, actions, and affects. The new harms relate, in Lichtenberg’s analysis, to dif-
fuse social processes, which gather their momentum and impactfulness over time, 
and after stable public policy development and millions of actions that proceed 
according to legal rules and accepted practices. Such harms are widely identified by 
legal philosophers as out-sized and irregular, and as struggling to attain moral con-
straints (positive and negative duties to avoid aggregate harms) or effective redress 
and recognition within modern legal systems (Lichtenberg 2010, Young 2013, Mor-
ton 2013). Specifically, Lichtenberg clarifies, ‘[T]he model of harm underlying the 
classic formulation of the harm principle—discrete, individual actions with observ-
able and measurable consequences for particular individuals—no longer suffices to 
explain the ways our behavior impinges on the interests of other people’ (Lichten-
berg 2010, p. 558). It also does not, as the Anthropocene thesis suggests, account for 
the impact on non-human existences (biotic, abiotic) and communities.
‘Cetology’ is important, in sum and as a starting point for the coming analyses of 
corporate legal order, because it probes the gallery visitors’ attentiveness to natural-
cultural entanglement and colliding earth and world histories and time-scales. Com-
modity and natural histories hang in the air of the museum, riveted together and 
ominous, ‘the non-mortal remains of mortal beings’ (Brown 2015 p. 209). Jungen’s 
sculpture references shifting shapes of harm and injustice, as it invites visitors to 
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contemplate how material remnants of the way that we live and, sometimes, dom-
inate others might be concretely understood in a monumental allegory of plastic-
driven extinctions.
II
A material kind of distributed impactfulness, and even ruin, has long been asso-
ciated with commercial organisations and industrialisation (Polanyi 2001). Legal 
debates that discuss and assess modern-day corporate governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) reflect this, and identify the corporation as an influen-
tial and impactful social actor since the inter-war economy (1918–1939). Corporate 
power augmented in this period and throughout the twentieth century as a factor 
of size, growing operational capacity, and the integration of corporate units within 
multi- and transnational firms (Parkinson 1995). This process accommodated, and 
was in fact advanced by, the rising interests and expectations of investors (at the end 
of the nineteenth century) and, later on, by investment managers (late twentieth cen-
tury), seeking ‘profitable outlets’ for capital and trading, after the institutionalisation 
of (their own) limited liabilities (Ireland 2017).10
Scholars working across different disciplines (law, anthropology, sociology) 
observe how migrations of force and affect attend the global networks of companies, 
including flows of labour, resources, and information across human, plant, mineral, 
animal bodies and environmental change processes (Fortun 2009; Dolan and Rajak 
2016). Impact and sometimes harm is cultivated across the complex systems of pro-
duction, including decentralised structures of enterprise association and direct and 
indirect forms of political engagement by companies, which grow companies’ ‘influ-
ence over broader relationships’ and over the ‘institutions that shape and constrain 
the substantive realisation of human rights’ (Macdonald 2011, p. 549). Relevant 
harms, which gestate across the actions, organisations, and supply chains involving 
companies, commonly bypass domestic accountability traditions (in tort law, crimi-
nal law, environmental controls, labour law and health and safety legislation), due to 
the transnationalisation of corporate activity and the diffusion of harms (Macdonald 
2011; Young 2013). Alternatively, corporate impacts do not attract legal enforce-
ment in countries seeking to improve their competitiveness, or to attract investment, 
by reducing the costs of  social and environmental compliance and mitigation for 
companies at law (Simons and Macklin 2014; Banerjee 2012; Baxi 2016).
Voluntary-styled corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate environ-
mental responsibility (CER) programmes have rapidly advanced, in this norma-
tively  and  materially fragmented context, as a practical means of ‘enlightening’ 
business actors about their impacts and associations, with near and distant commu-
nities (Campbell et  al. 2007). In legal terms, these programmes rely on reflexive 
and soft law, and mainly comprise disclosure laws, designed to encourage corporate 
10 For more on the history of limited liability and the (later) emergence of corporate ‘separate legal per-
sonality’, Ireland et al. (1987).
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reporting on non-economic performance and environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) factors ‘material’ to businesses;11 directors’ duties concerned with manag-
ers’ regard for ‘wider’ interests, including labour, suppliers, customers, communities 
and the environment, when promoting the success of the company for the benefit 
of the members;12 and non-binding codes and international instruments that aim to 
improve reflexivity at companies about impacts, including distant ties and effects, 
and ‘respect’ for human rights.13
Many corporate legal scholars express concerns about the adequacy of this 
approach. Their reluctance mainly concerns the predominance of soft law and guid-
ance to companies, the absence of enforcement mechanisms and standards, and the 
maintenance of market institutions that seem to militate against the advance of non-
economic priorities. Companies must still proceed with CSR and CER on a ‘busi-
ness case’ basis.14 Shareholders and financial markets still retain legal priority over 
other stakeholders and communities.15 Company lawyers and policy makers refer, 
in response, to the engagement that is now being demanded of companies with mat-
ter and materiality. This turn (to matter) is evident in laws that direct companies 
to account for ‘environmental, social, and governance’ risks and factors, to insti-
tute non-financial performance indicators and resource efficiency, and to consider 
‘the responsibility of businesses for their impacts on society’ (European Commis-
sion 2011), whilst ‘contributing to society’ and ‘promoting long-term sustainable 
success’.16 Companies are invited to perform risk-based ‘due diligence’ on actions 
and associations, to dig deeper into their subcontractors’ business practices, and to 
account for the material and ‘multi-dimensional nature of CSR’—as ‘at least’ cov-
ering community and stakeholder involvement, human rights, labour and employ-
ment practices, tax and environmental issues, and combating bribery and corrup-
tion (European Commission 2011, at 3.3). The overlying demand, as such, is for 
a grounding of companies in consequential matters and relationships, perhaps a 
wholehearted coming to terms with the materiality of itself.
Yet, a dissonance or countermand is also at play. This dissonance arises where the 
recent history of corporate law and governance is not really material or grounded in 
11 In the UK, see Sections 414A-D Companies Act 2006 (c.46) (implementing Directive 2014/95/EU) 
and the Modern Slavery Act 2015, Section 54. For a summary of obligations for environmental report-
ing, see HM Government (2019).
12 Section  172 Companies Act 2006 (c.46). On the attention demanded of shareholders, see the UK 
Stewardship Code 2020 and the EU Commission ‘Action Plan on Sustaining Sustainable Growth’ (2018), 
available for download at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/info/publi catio ns/susta inabl e-finan ce-renew ed-strat egy_
en. Accessed 20 August 2020.
13 Global instruments include the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGP) (www.ohchr .org), the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) (https ://sdgs.
un.org/goals ), and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (https ://mnegu ideli nes.oecd.org/). 
Accessed 20 August 2020.
14 Legal advice on the level of directors’ ‘regard’ towards non-economic stakeholders and interests is set 
out in R (on the application of People and Planet) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin) Queen’s 
Bench Division (QBD), with the limits of the ‘business case for CSR’ confirmed at paragraph 12, and 
discussed in Talbot (Talbot 2013).
15 Talbot (2016), Baxi (2016), Villiers (2018).
16 UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, Principle A.
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matter (never mind geology). It is, rather, better understood as part and parcel of the 
idealistic and modern reflexive tradition, which has expressed itself powerfully within 
the economic sphere through the recognition and extension of separate corporate legal 
personality, as the ‘systemically privileged juridical “human” subject’ (Grear 2015, p. 
227; see also Baars 2019, a ‘legal concept to “congeal” relations of production’, p. 11). 
This idealistic history of corporate legal personhood is concerned less with the build-
up of matter and consequences around profit and investment as it is concerned with the 
advance of the corporate form and expectation, and with the development of industrial 
reason as a means of  reconciling different bodies, interests, and goals. It probes, in 
policy terms, ‘what is expected of enterprises’ (European Union Commission 2011, 
at 1.2), and settled rights, interests, and purposes for companies, specifically entrepre-
neurial applications and the purposes of wealth generation.17
Evidence of this history of expectation can be gleaned from classic Anglo-American 
company law and governance debates from the start of the twentieth century, which, 
as Lyman Johnson (2017) argues, elaborated on the internal governance systems and 
structures of the company and swept away older debates about the ‘power’ and ‘pub-
lic’ obligations of corporate entities. US law professors Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle, 
Lyman points out, used their leading intervention in the 1930s to direct attention to the 
‘interests of the company’ and to the duties of managers, as guardians of the corpo-
rate body and, also, of wider interests, entangled with business. So that ‘[R]ather than 
addressing the obligations of the business itself’, and the material nature of corporate 
organisations and activities, the classic debates ‘emphasized the duties of those who 
governed the business’, after ‘abandoning a regulatory philosophy’ from around the end 
of the nineteenth century (ibid. p. 571). The distinction of expectation  and manage-
ment here is important, where it suggests that the common reading of the Berle-Dodd 
debate, as between stakeholder versus shareholder characterisations of corporate actors, 
is less than the full story. Equally important, for this analysis, is the foundation that 
this classic company law debate provides for avoiding corporate matters and conse-
quences as a whole, whilst conceptualising the company in terms of (only) contractual 
metaphors and fiduciary duties, managerial norms and calculations (rather than as an 
institution with a seperate and material existence in its own right). This dematerialised 
reading or ‘interpretation’ of the company matters where it makes tracing the social and 
environmental imprint of companies difficult, since much of the disclosure and verac-
ity  required continues to lie with managers (as guardians).  It has tended, in practice, 
to also undermine common participation within the company and to limit managerial 
discretion to the shareholder primacy norm, even against pressure for change, where 
this offers a strong means for ‘clarifying expectations’ and for improving market disci-
pline over directors (entrenching, as such, a much-criticised theorisation of companies 
by financial economists from the 1990s).18
Recent UK reforms within corporate law and governance point to growing unease 
with the ongoing consolidation of expectation, over (attention to) matter (which 
Johnson describes as ‘corporate deregulation’ in the CSR and CER context). Pol-
icy makers try to counter this unease as above, encouraging more material concerns 
17 Grear 2015; see also on the legal history of corporate ‘separate legal personality’, Ireland et al. (1987).
18 Related by Johnson (2017), Ireland (2017), and in detail by Talbot (2013, pp. 102–144).
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and modes of reflection at companies (and investors). But this work is not easy, or 
altogether coherent, when expectation and industrial reason combine to make matter 
‘amenable’ (to management), and the main mode of communicating with companies 
and their decision-makers in the deregulated sphere is still the market and demand—
arenas built for immediacy, instrumentalism, and economic ambitions (i.e. compe-
tition, market discipline, corporate self-regulation), and vulnerable to inequalities 
in voice and ‘reified’ wills (Teubner 2020). The problems are visibly borne out in 
recent research (Lawrence et al. 2020), which suggests that UK companies (at least) 
are still highly shareholder-orientated, in practice and long after the development of 
CSR and CER systems for the regard of intergenerational matter, including environ-
mental crisis and inequality.19 Dividend payments from FTSE 100 companies hit 
a record £110.5 billion in 2019 in the UK—a rise of 10.7% over 2018 and more 
than double the £54 billion paid out in 2009 (Lawrence et al. 2020, p. 2). Guidance 
for companies introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic has not (to date) 
advanced legal or substantive changes to mainstream corporate expectations and pri-
orities, which still, too often, leave existences confined to the margins, to ‘ruin on’.20
III
In his 1934 essay on Franz Kafka, Benjamin talks about the author’s interest in 
exposing the ‘fullness of the world’, as ‘the only reality’ (Benjamin 2015, p. 127). 
‘Everything forgotten mingles’, Benjamin says of Kafka’s atmospheric literature, 
‘with what has been forgotten of the prehistoric world, forms countless, uncertain, 
changing compounds, yielding a constant flow of new, strange products’ (ibid.). 
Kafka’s animation of different forms and non-humans interests Benjamin, where it 
meets his understanding of the task of the writer, which is to move ‘cosmic ages in 
his writings’ and to do so ‘in the presence of others: He does not live for the sake of 
his own life, he does not think for the sake of his own thought. He feels as though 
he were living and thinking under the constraint of a family’ (composed of ‘human 
beings and animals’) (ibid. p. 126). By following the families’ bidding, Kafka moves 
‘the mass of historical happenings as Sisyphus rolled the stone’ (ibid. p. 126). The 
world’s ‘nether side comes to light; it is not a pleasant sight’, says Benjamin, but 
‘Kafka is capable of bearing it’ (ibid. p. 126), as he writes and exposes ‘insoluble 
behavioural problems’ and the ‘limits of understanding at every turn’ (ibid. p. 120).
19 Discussing and critiquing the environmental crisis and situation at law for corporate lawyers, Sjåfjell 
(2018), Talbot (2016). Discussing the continued advance of competitive and growth-orientated eco-
nomic institutions, and their limited cognitions of matter (including environmental crisis and inequality), 
Hickel (2019) and Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (Philip Alston) 
(2020).
20 Recent advice is set out in Financial Reporting Council (2020), available at: https ://www.frc.org.uk/
about -the-frc/covid -19/compa ny-guida nce-updat ed-20may -2020-(covid -19) (Accessed 25 August 2020). 
Sjåfjell (2018) makes the case for amending the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) to clearly advance sus-
tainability and stakeholder purposes (over shareholders), assessing also scope to develop these purposes 
within the existing CA 2006 Section 172. Talbot (2013) discusses difficulties with the present legislation, 
probing the point about expectations, capital markets, and investors.
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Things are routinely forgotten by Kafka’s characters in Benjamin’s reading of 
the main works; (of The Trial) ‘It is as though nothing new was being imparted, as 
though the hero was just being subtly invited to recall something that he had forgot-
ten’ (Benjamin 2015, p. 127). This forgetting does not mean that certain happenings 
‘do not extend into the present’: on the contrary, some things are ‘actual by virtue of 
this very oblivion. An experience deeper than that of an average person can make 
contact with it’ (ibid. p. 126). A ‘prehistoric world’ begotten by ‘guilt’ (ibid. p. 128) 
and arenas like ‘attics’, the place of collectible but ‘discarded, forgotten objects’ (ibid. 
p. 129), are drawn, by Benjamin, alongside Kafka’s fascination with forums of the 
legal process. This is where ‘the necessity to appear before a court of justice gives 
rise to a feeling similar to that with which one approaches trunks in the attic, which 
have been locked up for years’ (ibid. p. 129). Benjamin is intrigued by Kafka’s unor-
thodox method for attending the discounted and, also, by related questions of justice. 
He highlights Kafka’s deployment of non-humans as ‘receptacles of the forgotten’ 
(ibid. p. 128) and as ‘outsiders to the law’. ‘This much is certain’, he observes, ‘of all 
of Kafka’s creatures, the animals have the greatest opportunity for reflection. What 
corruption is in the law, anxiety is in their thinking’ (ibid. p. 128). Kafka’s animals 
are possessed, he says, with ‘the natural prayer of the soul’, which is ‘attentiveness’ 
(2015, p. 130), in a situation where ‘the gate to justice is learning’ (ibid. p. 135).
Benjamin developed these ideas—about the fullness of the world, oblivion 
amongst purportedly ‘rational’ actors, and the limits of human understanding, 
including at law—in a number of his works in the 1920s and 1930s. He addressed 
themes that Jungen also invoked for us, including the creaturely (as reflexive), the 
ability of the non-human (the chair, whale) to offer historical testimony, and an 
ironic shattering of traditions amidst otherness, ‘which is the obverse of the cri-
sis and the renewal of mankind’ (ibid. p. 215). Benjamin offered an early (1925) 
systematisation of these ideas in his work about the mourning play, The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama (Benjamin 1998). This is where, in the ‘Prologue’ to the 
main text, Benjamin introduces the concept of ‘natural history’ [Naturgeschichte] 
as a horizon expressive of social historical content, and as destination for the mate-
rial or textual ‘fragment’ that lives on beyond ‘intentionality’ and the philosophy of 
consciousness. In later works, which study industrial culture and the ‘debris’ of the 
commercial arcades of Paris in the nineteenth century (1999), Benjamin documents 
occurrences that live on, more specifically, beyond the accommodations (and victo-
ries) of modern commercial systems and ideologies, including their value-structures.
Benjamin, like the present paper and issue, was keen in these works to move away 
from modern and idealistic conceptions of societal-nature relations, which categorised 
nature as pre-given and as the back-drop to human action (and instrumentalism). He 
emphasised, instead, the entangled and historical nature of being (origin ‘describes that 
which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance, … an eddy in the 
stream of becoming’), and studied occurrences beset by ‘the past and the subsequent 
history’ of their essences (Benjamin 1998, p. 47). He deployed concepts like ‘transi-
ence’ and ‘decay’ as a means of capturing matters of consequence, fragmentation, ruin, 
and living on; and as horizons of existence that could be understood secularly—that is, 
as not exclusively anthropogenic in their development (not relatable only to the con-
cerns of humans). Benjamin saw in this living on proof of the fullness of the world, but 
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also, the historical dynamization of intransient ideas and calculations (the social and 
material content of the idea). He used the insight to suggest that we might trace liv-
ing history from the surfaces of ‘surviving’ objects, working from visual concreteness 
and bodies of affect that reach into the realm of experience, and demand translation 
as such. These remnants or bodies demand interpretation, as a matter of justice, where 
they undercut the usual antinomies between causality and morality, natural history and 
world history (invoking the juridical problem identified by Lichtenberg 2010; Hanssen 
2000, p. 36). But also because the decaying matters presented or contained, for Benja-
min, new possibilities for reading history against the grain of what humanistic actors 
had valued or accounted for (so far).
To this end (of justice), Benjamin developed a citation mode of ‘writing’ social his-
tory. It sought to document ruin, decay, and discontinuity, carving out dates for their 
‘physiognomy’ (Benjamin 1999: N11). The philosopher pioneered creative techniques 
of montage and juxtaposition, collecting objects, texts, and experiences, which could 
evoke different times and matters in the context of loss, and create ‘flashes of recog-
nition’ (1999, N1,1; 2015, at p. 247: ‘the past can be seized only as an image which 
flashed up at the instant when it can be recognized’). Benjamin’s works commended 
the techniques of allegory, aura, juxtaposition and distance, for adding to the compre-
hension of ‘the social bases of the contemporary decay’ (Benjamin 2015, p. 216), and 
for adopting a ‘dual insight’.21 As allegorist, Benjamin’s theories sought not to affirm 
the ‘truth’ of this nether world, nor to restore any ‘truer’ set of associations ‘that may 
have been lost or obscured’ (theorist Craig Owens on the ‘allegorical impulse’ 1980, 
p. 69). His historical method invoked, rather, multiplicity and transience  as  really-
existing contemplative objects, adding layers of meaning, writing over commodity his-
tories with effects and experiences, to enact a ‘vertical or paradigmatic reading of the 
correspondences on a horizontal or syntagmatic chain of events’ (Owens 1980, p. 73). 
Benjamin’s philosophy aimed, as such, at a redemption of the semantic potential of the 
past, contextualizing objects and experiences in such a way that their philosophical-
political meaning might be revealed, and perhaps also ‘counter-posed’ as a site of con-
tingency, consciousness and duty. ‘It is … of decisive importance’, he said, ‘that a new 
partition be applied to this initially excluded, negative component so that … a positive 
element emerges in it too’ (Benjamin 1999, N1a3).
IV
This paper started with ‘Cetology’s’ illumination of ruin and the impacts that accumulate 
after commodities and industries in uncontained times. It examined corporate entangle-
ments and responsibilities, which, also, intersect with large-scale environmental crises 
and legions of the impacted. Help with this task was teased from Benjamin and Adorno 
on the ‘idea of natural history’, and the deployment of ruin and allegory as a means of 
returning actors and systems to the ‘fullness’ of their pasts. The paper, in this final part, 
21 Of this realm, he said, ‘Its rhythm is apparent only through dual insight. On the one hand it needs 
to be recognized as a process of restoration and reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely 
because of this, as something imperfect and incomplete’ (Benjamin 1998, p. 45).
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explores how shifting shapes of harm and injustice that are relatable to business actors 
might be sensed and interpreted after this art and text and their methods, within legal 
and responsibility systems now facing alterity, distress, and ruin. It contemplates how 
the company might be seen, secularised and made dutiful towards diffuse impacts, not 
through more management and governance (strategies critiqued in Part II) but after re-
contextualising the company among matters and the ‘historical imagination’.
The prospect sounds imaginative. It does accord, though, with growing amounts of 
legal and normative engagement with diffuse matters and the ‘age of consequences’ 
at law. Such engagement is evident, for instance, in the recent increases in climate 
litigation, which seeks to hold governments and private organisations responsible for 
climate change-related damage and/or threats of damage.22 Legal scholars and practi-
tioners, discussing the cases, highlight the prospects for large-scale harm objects and 
social-natural entanglements to be ‘legally disruptive’ (Fisher et al. 2017). This dis-
ruption occurs where certain diffuse, uncertain, polycentric, spatially and temporally 
overflowing matters, which enter experience, ‘promote reflection’ about the nature of 
legal adjudication and legal reasoning embedded in the law (ibid. p. 260). Courts and 
lawyers, confronted with rising matters and temporal mutiny, can work in imagina-
tive and activist ways to expand the capacity of law to hold public and private entities 
accountable for material damage and threats, developing and extending (for instance) 
domestic precedents on twentieth-century mass harms (e.g. tobacco and asbestos 
litigation, business and human rights) (Aristova 2018, Rühmkorf  2015,  Ganguly 
et al. 2018). Major advances in scientific knowledge about harm and environmental 
transformation help to ‘strengthen the causal link’ between protagonists and dam-
age (Ganguly et al 2018, pp. 10–13), and to afford a broader range of arguments and 
litigation strategies to lawyers (Fisher et al. 2017; Mason-Case 2019). Legal scholars 
researching in this vein draw, too, from theories and methods of the ‘new materialist’ 
scholars’, as a set of ideas comparably attentive to the relational constitution of conse-
quential matter, and to the disruptive potential of trans-generational ‘collectives’  and 
‘raw materials made of poor humans and humble non-humans’ (Latour 1993, pp. 
114–115; Haraway 2016; Davies 2017).23
But what of the corporation in this matter-bound context, and the opportunities 
that lie around it for legally and normatively ‘disrupting’ company law and the politi-
cal economies of ‘business as usual’, including shareholder primacy and disembod-
ied corporate governance? In Part II, the paper identified corporate law (and CSR and 
22 Recent corporate litigation includes the 2015 NGO petition seeking to determine the accountability 
of ‘Carbon Majors’ for the ‘human rights implications of climate change and ocean acidification’ at the 
Philippines Human Rights Commission (Re. Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Others v Carbon Majors 
(2019), Case No CHR-NI-2016–0001 (2015), judgement at https ://clima tecas echar t.com/non-us-case/
in-re-green peace -south east-asia-et-al/ (accessed 20 August 2020)); and Milieudefensie et al. v Shell plc, 
currently before the Netherlands domestic courts, with human rights and tort obligations in contention, 
which, importantly, seek to extend the outcome of Urgenda v Dutch State (2019, Sup. Ct. of the Nether-
lands, Number 19/00,135) to business organisations. See the legal summons, at https ://www.foei.org/wp-
conte nt/uploa ds/2019/04/2019-04-05-SUMMO NS-dagva ardin g-unoffi cial -trans latio n-of-the-Dutch -origi 
nal.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).
23 Davies describes and defines new materialism as broadly situating ‘human’ action in a ‘material world 
where all matter, living and non-living, is related, where objects have their own vitality and resistance, 
and where agency emerges in relation rather than as an existing quality’ (2017, p. 66).
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CER) as an area where rising matters are made ‘amenable’ to expectation, and must 
currently achieve economic status and recognition, or they might fall into the tide of 
‘natural history’—of ‘things created by man, yet lost to him’ after ‘progress’ (Adorno 
1984, p. 117). Instructive, on this point, is the recent US decision, New York v Exxon 
Mobil (2019),24 part of the second wave of climate litigation (as characterised by Gan-
guly et al 2018).25 In this case, the global energy corporation, Exxon Mobil, success-
fully defended itself against allegations of fraud for potentially misleading investors 
about climate risks to the company. The New York Attorney General, bringing the 
case, failed to establish that the corporation made material misstatements or omissions 
that could have misled any ‘reasonable investor’ about its practices for accounting for 
climate risk. The court came to this conclusion after reviewing the non-financial infor-
mation issued by the company,26 but also by gathering evidence about the ‘material-
ity’ of the information for managers and investors. The court found ‘no evidence’ that 
ExxonMobil’s non-financial information had ‘any market impact at the time they were 
published or that investment analysts took note of the contents of these documents, 
which were widely disseminated’ (New York v Exxon Mobil 2019, p. 8, emphasis 
added). The court accepted the ‘total mix of information’ available and, also, evidence 
about the satisfaction of investors with information addressed to shareholders on the 
management of climate risk.27 ‘The Office of the Attorney General offered no testi-
mony from any investor who claims to have been misled’, summarised the court (ibid. 
at p. 38, emphasis added), adding that ‘No reasonable investor during the period from 
2013 to 2016 would make investment decisions based on speculative assumptions of 
costs that may be incurred 20+ or 30+ years in the future’ (ibid. at p. 34).
This summons of investors’ capacity for judgement and better nature is echoed 
across mainstream corporate governance and law. Relatable court judgements in 
the UK and beyond confirm ‘business judgement’ as a first-order forum for reflec-
tion on large-scale, inter-temporal risks and phenomena. Courts remain reluctant 
to assert obligations that could counteract or interfere with commercial expecta-
tions. They affirm moral rather than legal obligations at the international level to 
mitigate climate change risks at companies (in Re. Greenpeace Southeast Asia and 
Others 2019),28 and enforceable domestic obligations for directors and companies 
24 New York v Exxon Mobil (2019) N.Y. Supt. Ct. 2019, Doc. No. 567.
25 Earlier waves of tort claims against ExxonMobil, which did not establish sufficient proximity or causal 
links to large-scale atmospheric change for success, are set out by Ganguly et al (2018). ‘Specifically, the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish causation because there was “no realistic possibil-
ity of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific 
person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time”’ (2018, p. 9).
26 The relevant ‘information available to ExxonMobil investors during the relevant period included an 
annual, publicly-filed report called the Outlook/or Energy, the two March 2014 Reports, ExxonMobil’s 
Form 10-Ks, ExxonMobil’s annual Corporate Citizenship Reports, and a host of other publicly available 
information that was not the subject of testimony at trial (including ExxonMobil’s Annual Shareholder 
reports)’ (2018, pp. 9–10).
27 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation and Arjuna Capital ultimately agreed to withdraw their pro-
posed shareholder resolutions (inviting directors to improve reporting on climate change risk and man-
agement) based on information shared by the company at the December 2013 meeting and ExxonMobil’s 
undertaking there to address climate related inquiries (2018, pp. 14–15).
28 See note 27.
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to meet commercial expectations, sometimes over ‘green’ hopes and aspirations (in 
the UK, R (People and Planet) v HM Treasury 2009).29 The courts, in these cases, 
would seem to pull back from the ‘disturbed certainties’ that attend the integration 
of geological and human time-scales, and the possibilities  that lie, within this,  for 
‘temporally dis-contained’ or ‘vertical’ norm contemplation. Legacies of affect must 
still find their place among ‘competitive principles’ (cited as a legitimate limit on 
‘materiality’ in New York v ExxonMobil 2019, at p. 35), as markets remain predomi-
nant for collating public preferences and guiding ‘judgement’  about harm objects 
(evidence is led about the priority of ‘cash flow’ for informing expectations at ibid, 
p. 39). The justices miss the widening cognitive and legitimacy-crisis, which now 
attends modern competitive economic systems, struggling to comprehend how 
nature and history ‘break apart and interweave’ in their company, or to develop dif-
ferent principles of ‘care’ and ‘attention’ for the hazards and losses left behind.
An alternative approach and method is probed by this paper, which wants to expand 
the ways in which corporate lives are talked about, regulated and experienced, away 
from the normalised conceptualisation of companies as self-knowing and self-gov-
erning actors. This method engages the  ‘idea of natural history’ as a register for re-
thinking corporate impact and entanglement as a seperate and material existence, which 
bears upon issues of justice and equality, and seeks to collate wider experiences apart or 
distinct from the company and investors: to ‘extend the list of movements that have to 
be taken into account’, as Bruno Latour summarises for the new materialists, also intent 
on ‘tracing’ the affect that attends the march of economization and modern frailties 
(Latour 2018, p. 87).30 Importantly, the ‘more that we see the erosion of the constitutive 
character of the mind’, of corporate management ‘adumbrated’ by loss and crisis, ‘the 
more insistent becomes the need not just to register existing reality, but to reflect upon it 
and understand it’ (Adorno 2006, p. 127, emphasis added). The matters, which extend 
beyond law and order (and the proclaimed ‘end’ of corporate legal history), speak in 
this proposition not against certainty and expectation (as the judges and indeed share-
holder primacy advocates fear), but to ‘the ruin of time, and a process of decay that is at 
the same time a process of crystallization’ (Arendt, in Benjamin 2015, p. 55). This ‘pro-
cess’ (time + ruin+contemplation) is important and distinct, where it enacts presence, 
29 Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court. In this English case, the Court confirms matching legal 
obligations in the UK Companies Act 2006, Section 172, for directors and investors not to ‘skew’ the per-
formance of companies ‘in an anti-competitive way’ (at paragraph 12). See also, recent EU developments, 
concerned with shareholder and investor manager duties to attend ESG and the ‘long-term’ but within 
(still) growth-orientated models of economic development, discussed in Möslein and Sørensen (2018).
30 In his classic text, We Have Never Been Modern (1993), Latour also engages the ‘idea of natural 
history’ (though he does not use this term). Deficits in meaning and existence arise in his theory after 
modern constitutionalism and scientific reason partition some ‘actors’ or ‘actants’ into the ‘background’ 
in the search for ‘a society with predictable and stable interests and stakes’ (Latour 1993, pp. 10–11). 
‘Discounted’ elements do not disappear or become permanently disassociated from modern systems and 
organisations, for Latour either. Rather, natural-cultural or ‘hybrid’ phenomena ‘live on’, and form part 
of our experiences (see, for instance, pp. 1–3). Latour’s wider work suggests that networked and medi-
ated matter might be ‘traced’ on a materialist horizon, when we ‘study in detail the world of produc-
tion of hybrids and the world of elimination of these same hybrids’ (and discover that ‘we have never 
been modern’, Latour 1993, pp. 46–47). The present reading of Adorno (1984) and Benjamin (1998) is 
intended to add to, but also query, the new materialist empirical method and promise, in the development 
of allegory and accounting for ‘ruin’, the ‘lost’, and ‘decay’. See Fortun (2014).
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participation, and imagination from and for the margins of economy and law as a pros-
pect emboldened by time (the ruin as ‘second nature’ (Adorno 1984), ‘interpretation 
presupposes the decay of systems’ (Adorno 2006, p. 127)). Critically, it (time) assigns 
contingency to modern structures and actors, including the corporation, relating con-
sciousness and duty to the ‘ruining’ and ‘lost’ as well as the participant and lively, and 
finding witnesses among the mutinous and creaturely for the ‘anxieties’ of modernity’s 
‘god tricks’, including industrial reason.
Jungen, Benjamin and Kafka deploy the historical imagination and allegory—the 
‘intuition of impermanence’31—as a technique for extending presence, after this spirit. 
Hard though this idea is to grasp, from a legal perspective, the intuition that drives 
it—and art like ‘Cetology’—is fitting to the fullness that attends corporate actions, 
and the entanglement with ‘new’ harms. In these full or swampy situations, which 
throw up co-existence and temporal mutiny at every turn, corporate responsibility 
scholars, turned ‘allegorist’, might also want to juxtapose companies’ affect histories 
to the moral captions that companies generate  (industrial reason’s ‘utopian poten-
tial’). They might relate intergenerational losses after new forms, which try to ‘make 
explicit’ the historical nature of what has been forgotten or ‘naturalised’ (as  losses, 
as beings impacted), learning from the ‘surfaces’ of surviving objects, ties, and com-
munities in geologic and montaged forms.32 Such methods are not meant to be a way 
to make the pile-ups of affect more ‘true’ for the law than, say, the economic achieve-
ments of companies and markets, as readers of Benjamin may anticipate (‘to article 
the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was”’ Benjamin 
2015, p. 247; ‘allegory could not exist if truth were accessible’, Cowan 1981, p. 114). 
Adopting a ‘dual insight’ (Benjamin), the law after the historical imagination cross-
checks calculation, and eternal trust in the corporate form, with a new-found receptive-
ness to the build-up of matter and histories of harm. It brings mortified and estranged 
natures ‘out of infinite distance’ and ‘into infinite closeness’, toward interpretation and 
the study of ‘decay’ as well as ‘detail’  in transient  forms.33 It becomes capable of 
‘bearing’ nether sides, and attics, and of counter-posing affect and experience to com-
mercial expectations and priorities, expanding (thus) the pathways for countenancing 
31 For more on allegory, see Owens (1980), Cowan (1981), and Buck-Morss (1991, pp. 160–201).
32 See Hofstätter (2019) on Adorno’s admiration for Beethoven’s ‘late’ style as an evocation of this 
explicitness and the natural history critique. Haraway (2016) also talks in a relatable way about work-
ing with ‘surviving’ natures and communities, pursuing engagements that cultivate the ‘lives’ and the 
‘details’ of ‘multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-material worlding’, advanced by ‘corporations, farms, 
clinics, labs, homes, sciences, technologies, and multispecies lives’ (p. 115), clarifying ‘details’ and tell-
ing ‘stories’ that could ‘link actual beings to actual response-abilities’ (p. 116).
33 Teubner (2020) uses the term ‘mediation’ in a relatable context (of presenting matters and ‘precon-
ceptual affect’); Latour (1993, 2018), for long now, has talked about ‘diplomacy’. The reference here to 
‘dual insight’ and ‘cross-checking’ is informed by Benjamin and his advice about transience (Benjamin 
1998, p. 45, see note 26) and not allowing ‘conformism’ to overpower matter (2015, p. 247, in ‘Theses 
on the Philosophy of History’).
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‘business as usual’ with new forms of historical reflection about corporate entangle-
ment and adding to duty or obligation at companies for legacy matters.34
Part IV offers, with this, to clarify the paper’s interest in substituting the natural-
ness of the company, and management, with spontaneous concern for the affected and 
for existences that lie within the horizons of ruin and disorder, at law. Times’ uncon-
tainment, in light of the crises the world is facing, could and should invoke a change 
in expectation for the company law field, assigning contingency to the corporation 
(and economics) and provoking a new mode of reflection about corporate entangle-
ment and responsibility at law, and across domestic and international legal fields.35 
The contribution that this essay and its interlocutors wants to make is to highlight and 
to explain that an important part of the justification for this turn towards obligation lies 
with matter and geology, animals and attics, rather than with the extension of idealistic 
and economic thinking or incentives. It is where meeting the challenges of the epoch 
requires a renewed commitment to ‘earthing’ but, also, ‘de-centering’ the corporation 
from its default position of judgement and self-knowing, matter by matter, community 
by community. Before things reach the air of the natural history museum, perhaps.
Conclusion
This paper has talked about art, theory and the ‘idea of natural history’, as a means 
of thinking corporate entanglement and responsibility for the Anthropocene. The 
findings invite lawyers, policy makers and scholars to increase their level of atten-
tiveness to corporate matters, and to attend the worlds, existents, environments, and 
autonomies impacted by business organisations over time. The primacy that the 
interlocutors (Jungen, Adorno, Benjamin, Kafka) accord natural history is powerful, 
in this context, in its capacity to position corporate organisations within natural-cul-
tural entanglement, as neither ‘bad guy’ (i.e. as the persistent subject of scandalisa-
tion) nor ‘saviour’ (as meeting all demands for responsiveness). Companies become, 
instead, implicated in, and bearing responsibility for, the kind of ruin that the epoch 
of the Anthropocene is making concrete and unwise to (only) bound, divide up, cal-
culate, and surpass. This modest end-point to the analysis captures the subtle radi-
calism of the artists and writers studied. It also, and finally, reveals what it means to 
34 Teubner (2020) talks about ‘counter-rights’ in this context and the potential for a ‘new law’. Tomlins 
identifies the promise of law adopting a different (live, unsocialised) relational other, such as history, the 
past, or (more than human) justice (Tomlins 2007). Haraway (2016) relates, in some detail again, the 
materialist’s efforts to command ‘details’ and tell ‘stories’ that ‘link actual beings to actual response-abil-
ities’, where revisiting the state of matter in concrete (ethnographic, sociological, artistic, experimental) 
terms means ‘a muscle critical for caring about flourishing gets some aerobic exercise’ (p. 116).
35 Scholars of the ‘new corporate accountability’ have widely identified relevant fields of obligation, for 
instance in contract law, tort law, labour law, international human rights and environmental law. Rühm-
korf (2015), Young (2013) and MacDonald (2011) discuss the collective dimensions to corporate harms 
and responsibilities and express their thoughts about how these dimensions might require new systems 
of liability, obligation and accountability (e.g. shared or network forms of liability).  Lawrence  et al. 
(2020) and Sjåfjell (2018) look at the options for ‘commoning’ the company and/or meaningfully chang-
ing the bounds of decision-making, ownership, benefit distribution, and participation.
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the author to ‘de-center’ the corporation, and to release earthly existences from the 
usualness of submitting to corporate expectation, one gulp of fresh air at a time.
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